government counter attack led by John Murray, marquis of Atholl. 3 However, in their anxiety to pass judgement upon the viability of Argyll's rising, historians have tended to underestimate its potential value as a case study of social and political dynamics in late-seventeenth-century Scotland, and the Highlands in particular. This article seeks to reassess the rebellion from that perspective, and it therefore aims neither to provide a narrative of the rising, nor an evaluation of the success of either Argyll's or Atholl's campaign. Instead, it begins by assessing the factors inspiring support for Argyll, focusing particularly upon kinship and religion. It then proceeds to consider the governmental response, asking how James VII's regime sought to counter the insurgency and why it adopted these approaches.
The roots of the 1685 rebellion stretched back to 1681, when Argyll had been convicted of treason following his refusal to take the Test Act (requiring all Scottish office holders to swear allegiance to the Episcopalian Church of Scotland) without qualification. Although it is likely that Charles II intended to pardon Argyll, at least partially, the earl took fright and fled the country. He settled first in London, where he began consorting with radical Whigs led by Anthony AshleyCopper, 1 st earl of Shaftsbury, but from the autumn of 1682 resided in exile in Friesland. There he became involved with the emigre community of both English and Scottish radicals which had gathered in the Netherlands, with his aim being to gain a subsidy of £30,000 Sterling to fund an insurrection in Scotland through which he hoped to win back his lands and position. Argyll was never able to secure anything like his desired amount (eventually he had to settle for funds of around £10,000, most of it coming from a wealthy English sympathiser named Ann Smith), and his plans were uncovered by the government late in 1683, but he nevertheless remained a figure of real Highlanders as mindless drones following the dictates of their chiefs, the reality was much less clear cut. Kinship certainly remained an important social glue, and membership of a particular kindred was still in many ways the cornerstone of Highland identity -as, indeed, it was for many in the Lowlands.
But such considerations were growing increasingly brittle, and by the later seventeenth century it was obvious that political authority could no longer be sustained through kinship ties alone (if, indeed, this had ever been possible). Instead, chiefly power was augmented by, for instance, forging formal friendships and alliances, holding office in the government bureaucracy, conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, courting the support of the Church, or asserting proprietary, rather than customary right to land. 17 Clanship, in short, clothed Highland elites in an aura of innate authority but, as Argyll discovered to his cost and surprise, there was a limit to what this could achieve when divorced from the wider matrix of elite power. Even if Breadalbane himself remained loyal, questions were still asked about the men he led. At a clandestine meeting of disaffected gentlemen from Cowal toward the end of May, it was suggested that many of Breadalbane's men were secretly sympathetic towards Argyll and might be ripe for recruitment to the rebel cause. The Secret Committee found these claims so plausible that they wrote to Atholl strenuously advising him to exercise caution. 24 There is in fact no firm evidence that Breadalbane faced such dissention, and certainly none that it undermined his contribution to the government war effort. But the fact that gossip existed at all reflects not only widespread and enduring suspicion that clanship was inherently subversive, but also the central importance of kinship as a recruiting agent for Argyll.
Nonetheless, support for Argyll could be rooted in issues other than clan obligation. Fear was one; Breadalbane noted in late May that many of Argyll's adherents had joined him simply in order to protect their livestock from destruction. 25 This, of course, became a handy excuse after Argyll's defeat, as in the case of more than forty erstwhile rebels later tried on Islay:
The pannellis all of them acknowledged ther going out of Ila with the late Argyll, but were compelled by force and fear, being threatened with fyre and sword by ane number of armed men … They had not the lest prejudice against the king or government, and in evidence therof they made ther escape and deserted him from tyme to tyme as occasion offered. 30 That some of Argyll's erstwhile partisans remained active weeks after the dispersal of the rebel force might suggest that they were simply waiting to see how the wider political situation developed, but it might also imply that it was plunder, not principle which was uppermost in their minds.
But these were all minority concerns. Aside from kinship, only one other motivating factor might be described as significant. Allan Macinnes has demonstrated that religious affiliation was a major factor in determining Highland loyalties during periods of Jacobite activity, and while it would be difficult to make the same claim for Argyll's rising, the religious dimension should be acknowledged.
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In the declaration which he famously had printed and distributed shortly after landing in Scotland, Argyll was careful to present his motivation as religious. Ever since the Restoration, he claimed, Charles II and James VII (the latter referred to only as the 'Duke of York' in token of the rebels' rejection of his kingship) had been engaged in a diabolical plot to undo the godly reforms of the Covenanters, relying upon arbitrary and tyrannical expedients to reintroduce Popery.
Having thus justified rebellion, the declaration proceeded to set out three broad aims: a true and pure 27 NRS, SC54/17/4/2/3, ff. 1-2. reported that most of the ethnically Lowland population had withdrawn from the parish church in order to attend these meetings, and it was further suggested by several witnesses that a number of children had been illegally baptised. In the end, enough evidence was found to fine nearly 100 people for attending these sermons. 37 Later, in October, an additional sixteen individuals were cited for communing with outlawed preachers. 43 Lee's thesis is compelling, but it should not obscure the fact that, on account of mundane administrative and financial challenges, the government was never quite as militarily strong in practice as it seemed in theory. 44 In part because of this, the Restoration regime had developed a track record of raising and exploiting irregular forces, especially from the Highlands. Highland recruitment into the standing army seems to have been minimal, and Highlanders had been thought so unreliable that the militia was seriously under developed in the Highland shires, but it was judged safe periodically to exploit the armed retinues of senior chiefs as augmentation for the government's own power -the infamous 'Highland Host' of 1678, incorporating Highlanders levied by the earls of Atholl, Moray, Perth, Mar and Caithness (later Breadalbane), was only the most obvious example. 45 This tendency was also reflected in the response to Argyll. On 17 May, just after the rebel landing, The theoretically enormous muster enacted to counter Argyll was however undermined by a number of factors, not least strategic considerations. The Secret Committee revealed its thinking in a letter to Breadalbane on 23 May:
As to the forces in the west wee are of opinion that they are more usefull at present in the west then with yow, our reasones are, that certainly Marquis Atholl ... will be hard enough for all that argyle can, and more than he designs to out in that place; and there is great ground for your lordhips opinion that if he have any designe of consequenc it most be in air-shyre or Galloway and therfor a good levy in all prudence is to be posted there.
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This stance originated with the king himself. James was convinced that the Argyllshire landings were a distraction, and that the real attack -and the real danger -lay in a potential rising of the disaffected Covenanters of the south west. 49 He focused, therefore, on using his formal military resources to block the rebels' path south; the regular army was permitted to advance no closer than Glasgow, while were other provisioning problems as well. Repeated undertakings to provide arms from the royal magazine, also at Stirling Castle, came to naught, and Atholl's force had to rely upon private stockpiles. Even clothing Atholl's men required emergency measures; a merchant named John Adam was given £1,500 to locate suitable attire for 'the highelanders presently imployed in his Majesties service', and he used this money to buy 1,000 pairs of shoes and 1,000 ells of plaid in Musselburgh.
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In short, the government's overriding concern as regards provisions was that enough be held in reserve to sustain the army and militia stationed in the south, a stance which reinforces the sense that its key strategic goal was to ensure that Argyll could not advance into the Lowlands.
With Scotland's formal military apparatus tied down, the active campaign came to rely almost exclusively on the irregular forces gathered under Atholl. Such an approach, which placed the burden of home defence upon private, local resources, had obvious advantages in terms of simplicity and cost effectiveness, but there were other positives as well. It is clear for instance that Atholl's campaign received a significant fillip from the fact that, thanks to centuries of highly successful aggrandisement in the west Highlands, the Argyll Campbells had many local enemies. For such people, siding with
Atholl was seen as a chance to exact revenge on the hated MacCailein Mór, and nowhere was this impulse more gleefully reflected than in the work of the Keppoch MacDonald (and virulently antiCampbell) poet Iain Lom, who gloried in Argyll's disgrace:
'S ann ort thàin' an dà latha Ged bha e grathann gun tighinn, Fhuair thu cùirt na bu leatha An déidh t'athair a mhilleadh; Ach gun aon bhuile claidheimh, Gun sàthadh gatha no sgine, Mar gum bàidhte na coinnlean Chaill thu t'oighreachd 's do chinneach. 54 simple Jacobite dry run, it is striking that the broad local divisions which would mark Highland Jacobitism were already more or less in place during Argyll's rising.
At the same time, Atholl's nominal strength was augmented by some seeking to use the rebellion as a cover for straightforward plunder. 58 Indeed, so extensive was this tendency that, in the view of one witness, the war effort had by mid-June become little more than an exercise in mass theft:
I beginne to wearie of this campaigne, since I see it is not by faire feighting wee are lyke to have a speedie issew of it, for I have realie to tender a hairt to take plaisore in the Lowing of herds of cows, and bleeting of sheip, and shriking of women folowing them in to owre camp, and if my honore, which I am possiblie more tender off then is nessessaire for a man in my sircumstances, hade not obliged me, and will still, to stay so long as I think it concerned, I The pillaging associated with the government campaign also reflects the key disadvantage of relying on clan levies. These were irregular troops, many glorying in their hatred of the Campbells, and Atholl's control over them was tenuous at best. The result was not only short term chaos, but also longer term destabilisation, as the commissioners for pacifying the Highlands observed in May 1686:
The highlands by reasone of the Late trowbles therin and the Libertie quhich the highlanders did then take to themselves Have casten off much of the former obedience to quhich they were formerly reduced.
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The prominence of clan levies was potentially disadvantageous for other reasons as well. Chiefs could not necessarily be relied upon to muster their men in a sufficiently timely fashion -the Reliance upon personal levies also complicated central supervision of the war effort. Having decided to hold both the regular army and the militia in reserve and instead out-source the conflict to
Atholl and other local elites, the government's own role was largely limited to its hit-and-miss efforts to provide supplies, and to offering intelligence; it was for instance the Secret Committee which informed Atholl on 30 May of a supposed plot on the part of the gentleman of Cowal to feign desertion from Argyll, infiltrate the loyalist camp and undermine its war effort by spreading misinformation or stimulating desertions. 68 The only significant government contribution came not from Scotland, but from England, in the form of a small fleet of five ships of the Royal Navy dispatched by the king. Having already worked to secure the south west coast, these had by early June succeeded in blockading Argyll's tiny flotilla at Ellengreg, which castle they bombarded and captured on 15 June. 69 Otherwise, the government was reduced to shouting suggestions from the sidelines. Although official advice (especially from Dumbarton) repeatedly warned Atholl not to engineer too hasty a confrontation, growing impatience as the rebellion progressed led the government to urge a more punitive and aggressive stance. On 20 May, the Secret Committee ordered Inveraray to be burned, 67 Woodsetters Lyfrenters and Tacksmen' offer bonds for the peaceable behaviour of their dependents as well as assuming responsibility for spoliations committed by them during the rebellion itself -a policy which attracted vehement protest from some Campbell lairds who regarded it as a 'too sevear measure of Iustice'. 80 The government would continue to regard Argyllshire with suspicion for much of the remainder of James VII's reign, but by the end of 1685 it felt sufficiently confident to allow
Atholl's lieutenancy to lapse in favour of resurrecting the commission of pacifying the Highlands.
The marquis himself, despite attempted reassurance from Melfort, regarded this as a personal snub engineered by his enemies.
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The comparatively muted reprisals which followed in the wake of the rebels' defeat reflect the general insignificance of the threat posed by Argyll. Despite genuine concern in the opening months of 1685, his rebellion had never really presented a significant challenge, and to that extent, historians are right to have paid it scant attention. Yet if Argyll's rising was a damp squib, it revealed in its failure much about the socio-political dynamics of late-seventeenth-century Scotland, and the Highlands in particular. Argyll, along with many other observers, seems to have assumed that his position as the major clan chief in the western Highlands would be sufficient to sustain a major campaign -that, in effect, he could lead a clan rising. But in this he was seriously mistaken, because 
